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Enhanced Memory for Fair-Related
Faces and the Role of Trait Anxiety
Gewnhi Park* , Benjamin U. Marsh and Elisha J. Johnson
Department of Psychology, Azusa Pacific University, Azusa, CA, United States
The current research examined whether fair consideration—a social norm that people
inherently prefer to confirm—would modulate face recognition. Each neutral face was
associated with fair or unfair offers via an economic decision task, the Ultimatum Game
(UG) task. After the UG, participants were asked to identify the faces of proposers
who made different offers. Enhanced memory was observed for fair-related compared
to unfair-related faces. Furthermore, high trait anxiety was associated with reduced
memory for fair-related faces. These results were further confirmed by signal detection
theory. The current research provided initial evidence that people showed enhanced
memory for faces that made fair offers from the economic decision task, and that
high trait anxiety was associated with reduced fair-related memory. Possible neural
mechanisms and the implication in economic and social situations have been discussed.
Keywords: fair-modulated memory, economic decision task, trait anxiety, the ultimatum game, anxiety-modulated
fair memory
INTRODUCTION
Human faces provide important social and biological information critical for shaping social
behavior (Park et al., 2012; Wiese et al., 2013). People demonstrate a remarkable ability to
discriminate and recognize human faces, which allows for successfully navigating the social world
(Park et al., 2012; Wiese et al., 2013). Also, people are capable of attuning their ability to detect
particular information about faces through experiences (Zebrowitz and Montepare, 2006). The
current research examined whether fair consideration—a social norm that people inherently prefer
to confirm—would modulate face recognition (Gächter et al., 2017). Furthermore, there is growing
evidence that trait anxiety plays a role in socioeconomic decision making that relies on the social
norm of fairness (Grecucci et al., 2013). In the current experiment, we examined whether trait
anxiety would modulate the impact of fair consideration on subsequent face recognition.
Theoretical Accounts of Face Perception
To understand the cognitive and neural mechanisms of face recognition, people initially relied on
the dual process model (Bruce and Young, 1986). The dual process model suggested that there are
two distinctive functional routes for the recognition of invariant facial identity and variant facial
expressions (Bruce and Young, 1986). Neuroimaging evidence has identified the inferior occipital
gyri and superior temporal sulcus (STS) as neural mechanisms for analyzing the facial expression
and the inferior occipital gyri and lateral fusiform gyrus for facial identity (Haxby et al., 2000). As
such, the dual process model obtained converging evidence from the neuroimaging studies and has
been widely accepted (Calder and Young, 2005).
However, the need for a more comprehensive model of face recognition in the social context
called for incorporating Gibsonian theories of perception (Gibson, 1966, 1979; Zebrowitz, 2006).
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The ecological theory emphasized the function and utility of
human perception on guiding behavior in social contexts and
highlighted the role that face recognition plays in guiding
adaptive social behavior and achieving goals (McArthur
and Baron, 1983; Zebrowitz, 2006). For example, people
demonstrated a remarkable ability to detect various social
attributes from physical appearance, including deceptive
intent (Runeson and Frykholm, 1983), motivational incentives
(Schultheiss et al., 2005), motion (Johansson, 1973), personality,
social relationships, sexual orientation, and teaching effectiveness
(Johansson, 1973; Ambady et al., 2000). This ability to detect
these attributes would help to determine how to behave in
various social contexts and guide social interaction. Not only
that but also people developed the ability to recognize particular
psychological traits through experiences, which would help
to guide interpersonal interaction and navigate the social
world (Zebrowitz, 2006). In this experiment, we examined
whether and how previous experiences of fairness would shape
face recognition.
Fair Consideration and the
Ultimatum Game
People inherently prefer the fair distribution of resources and
are antagonized by unfair distributions (Fehr and Schmidt, 1999;
Fehr and Camerer, 2007; Güroğlu et al., 2011). Moreover, the
assessment of fairness shapes and guides future social interaction
and interpersonal relationships: People prefer those who treat
them fairly and are angry at those who treat them unfairly
(Güroğlu et al., 2011). According to the norm compliance
framework, fair consideration is an important social norm that
people show a robust preference, even at the expense of monetary
sacrifice (Gächter et al., 2017). For example, in an economic
decision game known as the Ultimatum Game (UG) task, people
are willing to lose money for the sake of promoting fairness.
In the UG task, the proposer is given a sum of money, $10,
and makes offers to the responder as to how to split the money
between themselves (Sanfey et al., 2006; Scheres and Sanfey,
2006). Some offers are fair so that the money is evenly split
between the proposer and the responder ($5:$5). However, other
offers are unfair, such that the proposer receives more money
and the responder receives less money ($9:$1, $8:$2, or $7:$3).
Then, the responder decides whether to accept or reject the
offer. When the responder accepts the offer, the money will be
split between the two players according to the offer. When the
responder rejects the offer, neither receives anything. Therefore,
the rational response for the responder is to accept any offer
because any monetary reward is preferable to none. However,
extensive research has shown that the responders frequently
rejected unfair offers ($9:$1, $8:$2, or $7:$3), even if they would
not receive anything (Pillutla and Murnighan, 1996; Sanfey, 2003;
Tabibnia et al., 2008). The rejection of unfair offers was generally
construed as “altruistic punishment” for norm violation (Fehr
and Rockenbach, 2004; Frith and Singer, 2008). The responders
experienced an unpleasant emotion in response to unfair offers
and were willing to punish the proposers who made unfair offers
by depriving them of getting a greater share of the money, even
at the risk of forfeiting monetary profit (Fehr and Rockenbach,
2004; Frith and Singer, 2008).
Overview
Previous research has shown that fair consideration plays an
important role in economic decision-making. However, relatively
little is known about whether and how fairness associated with
the economic game would influence face recognition. Fair-related
faces carry important social and normative value. Moreover, the
assessment of fairness shapes and guides future social interaction
and interpersonal relationships (Güroğlu et al., 2011). According
to the ecological theory (Zebrowitz, 2006), face recognition
serves adaptive function and utility that help people to navigate
the social world and achieve goals (McArthur and Baron,
1983; Zebrowitz, 2006). Fair-related faces are inherently favored,
socially normative, and highly functional in guiding social
behavior (Güroğlu et al., 2011). For example, recognizing people
who make fair offers are advantageous for future economic
dealings because they are more likely to make fair business deals
in the future. Furthermore, it is more likely that people who
promote fairness abide by high ethical and moral principles,
which helps to build a meaningful interpersonal relationship.
Because of its high utility and function in the social world,
we predicted that people would be more likely to remember
people who make fair offers in a memory task subsequently
following the UG task.
Furthermore, we were interested in whether individual
differences in trait anxiety would influence fairness-modulated
face recognition. There is emerging evidence showing that
anxiety modulated the acceptance rate of offers in the UG
task, although the results are conflicting (Grecucci et al., 2013;
Luo et al., 2014). There is evidence that individuals clinically
diagnosed with anxiety disorders were more likely to accept
unfair offers compared to individuals without anxiety disorders
(Grecucci et al., 2013; Wu et al., 2013). The authors attributed this
result to the reluctance to face social confrontation to reinforce
the social norm of fairness (Grecucci et al., 2013). Individuals
with an anxiety disorder are more likely to experience negative
arousals while confronting fairness norm violation. As a result,
they are reluctant to confront and to punish those who violated
the fairness norm, thus being more likely to accept unfair offers.
Individuals with anxiety disorders were more likely to accept
unfair offers made by human partners while being more likely
to reject unfair offers made by computer partners (Wu et al.,
2013). However, this pattern was less obvious in participants with
sub-clinical anxiety. Luo et al. (2014) reported that high-anxious
individuals were more likely to reject unequal offers made
by human counterparts compared to computer counterparts.
However, no report was made about the difference in acceptance
rates between fair and unfair offers.
We speculated that anxiety would modulate the impact of fair
consideration on face recognition. It has been well documented
that individuals with high trait anxiety demonstrated different
cognitive bias, including memory bias, favoring threatening
stimuli (Clark, 1999; Wilson et al., 2006; Bishop, 2009; Van
Bockstaele et al., 2014). Individuals with high anxiety would want
to minimize the advantage and importance of fairness to avoid
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FIGURE 1 | Sample trial in the Ultimatum Game Task (A written consent has
been obtained from the individual for the publication of the image).
anxiety associated with confronting and punishing fair norm
violators. As a result, individuals with high anxiety may show
reduced memory for the proposers who made fair offers.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
Participants
One hundred ten undergraduate students (74 women; mean
age = 19.9, SD = 1.66) successfully completed the experiment
for partial course credit1. People with a history of emotional
disorders (e.g., anxiety and depression) were excluded from this
experiment. We excluded the data of one participant who had
very poor recognition accuracy (less than 20%), resulting in 109
participants. The ethics committee approved the study.
Procedure
The Ultimatum Game
Participants played a modified version of the ultimatum game
(UG) which was adopted from van’t Wout and Sanfey (2011). The
UG was programmed in E-prime software (Psychology Software
Tools, Pittsburgh). Before starting the experiment, participants
were given the rules of the ultimatum game, read the instructions
and completed three practice trials to ensure the participants
fully understood the game. On each trial, participants were first
presented with a picture of their human opponent. After the
proposal was presented, participants could respond by a button
and chose to press accept or reject (the offer). There was a
1The behavioral and cardiovascular data from one participant was lost due to
equipment failure and a computer error. According to G∗Power (Faul et al., 2007),
the sample size of 105 was proposed to detect medium effects of about p = 0.25.
The data are available online at:https://osf.io/5ch4n/
total of 24 trials that participants played a role as a responder
(see Figure 1 for an example of a full trial). Twenty-four trials
consisted of 6 fair offers ($5 to each player) and 18 unfair offers
defined as offering the participant less than half of the money.
The unfair set consisted of six offers of $3, six offers of $2, and
six offers of $1. We did not include $4 offers because $4 offers are
generally perceived as fair and thus frequently accepted. Forty-
eight neutral male faces were selected from the NimStim Face
Stimulus Set (MacArthur Foundation Research Network on Early
Experience and Brain Development). The offers were made by
male partners to avoid the gender effect (Kim et al., 2012), and the
order of partners and the pictures associated with each offer was
randomized. Participants were not informed of the total number
of trials in advance. The instructions emphasized that different
partners in the game would play the game independently of each
other, and participants were told that the games would be played
with the set of partners they saw. To encourage participants to
make decisions seriously, participants were told that they would
be paid 5% of the total amount of money earned in the game
in addition to course credit. After the UG task, participants
completed the filler task to create time delay before the surprise
recognition task.
Filler Task
For the filler task, participants completed several personality
questionnaires, including the Duke University Religion Index
(Koenig and Büssing, 2010), the Difficulties in Emotion
Regulation Scale (Gratz and Roemer, 2004), and the behavioral
inhibition system (BIS) and the behavioral activation or
behavioral approach system (BAS) scale (Carver and White,
1994). The filler task took 5 to 10 min2.
The Surprise Recognition Task
On the completion of the filler task, participants performed the
surprise face recognition task in which participants were asked
to identify the faces that made offers during the ultimatum
task. Participants saw 48 faces (24 old faces and 24 new
faces, which were taken from the NimStim Face Stimulus
Set) and were asked to indicate with a button press whether
each face was one of the faces they saw during the UG
task (Yes or No). Faces were presented in random order and
participants proceeded the recognition test at their own pace.
Response accuracy and latency were recorded. We report the
estimated proportion of accurate responses such that higher
scores reflect greater accuracy (1.0 = perfect accuracy). After the
task, participants completed the Spielberger State-Trait Anxiety
Inventory (Spielberger et al., 1983).
The Spielberger State-Trait Anxiety Inventory
The State–Trait Anxiety Inventory (STAI) is a widely used self-
report scale to measure anxiety. The STAI state focuses on
how respondents feel “right now, at this moment” (e.g., “I
2We conducted preliminary analyses to explore whether these personality
questionnaires modulated the acceptance rates and face recognition. No significant
result was obtained between scores from these personality questionnaires and face
recognition (ps > 0.33). However, there was a marginally significant interaction
between the acceptance rates and the Duke University Religion Index, F(3,
321) = 2.52, p = 0.06. We plan to examine the relationship in future studies.
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FIGURE 2 | Percentage of acceptance of the different offers.
feel at ease”; “I feel upset”), and the STAI Trait targets how
respondents “generally feel” (e.g., “I am a steady person”; “I lack
self-confidence”; Spielberger, 1989). The STAI consists of two
20-item, each of which can be rated on the basis of a 4-point
Likert scale, ranging from not at all to very much so for the STAI
State and from almost never to almost always for the STAI Trait
(Spielberger, 1989). The STAI has excellent internal consistency
(average ααs > 0.89), and especially, the STAI Trait has strong
test-retest reliability (average r = 0.88) at multiple time intervals
(Barnes et al., 2002).
RESULTS
The Ultimatum Game
Replicating previous research (van’t Wout et al., 2010), fair offers
($5) were almost always accepted, $5-$5: M = 97.9% (SD = 11.1),
and acceptance rates decreased as the offers became progressively
more unfair: $7-$3: M = 44.9% (SD = 43.1); $8-$2: M = 26.6%
(SD = 38.2); $9-$1: M = 17.1% (SD = 32.2; see Figure 2). To assess
the relationship between individual differences in trait anxiety
and the acceptance rates in the UG, we conducted a 4 (Offers: $5-
$5, $7-$3, $8-$2, $9-$1) repeated measures analysis of covariance
(ANCOVA) with z-standardized trait anxiety (STAI-trait) as a
covariate3. There was no interaction between trait anxiety and
type of offers (p = 0.60). Contrary to previous research linked high
anxiety to more acceptance of the unfair offers, we did not find
the relationship between anxiety and responses to unfair offers.
The Surprise Recognition Task
We analyzed the hit rates of faces who made different offers ($5-
$5, $7-$3, $8-$2, $9-$1) and new faces, (i.e., correct rejections)
using Friedman’s test, a non-parametric alternative to analysis of
variance (ANOVA; see Table 1). There was a significant difference
among the four conditions, χ2(3) = 124.65, p < 0.001. Post
hoc analysis with Wilcoxon matched-pairs signed-rank tests were
3We also conducted a 4 (Offers: $5-$5, $7-$3, $8-$2, $9-$1) × 2 (Gender: men,
women) mixed factorial analysis of variance (ANOVA) to examine the gender
effect. No interaction was observed (p = 0.34).
conducted with a Bonferroni correction applied. Participants
recognized significantly more faces that made $5-$5 (Mdn = 0.83)
than faces that made $9-$1 (Mdn = 0.50), Z = 7.21, p < 0.001,
r = 0.69, and $8-$2 (Mdn = 0.67), Z = 6.99, p < 0.001, r = 0.67.
However, there was no difference between $5-$5 and $7-$3
(Mdn = 0.83; p = 0.27). Thus, as predicted, people demonstrated
superior memory for faces that made fair offers ($5-$5) than those
that made unfair offers ($9-$1 and $8-$2).
To assess whether individual differences in trait anxiety
modulated subsequent fair-related memory, we conducted the
Quade test, one of the most frequently cited non-parametric
alternative to repeated measures analysis of covariance (Quade,
1967; Rheinheimer and Penfield, 2001), on the hit rates of three
types of faces (fair-related, unfair-related, new faces) with trait
anxiety (STAI-trait) as a covariate. There was the significant two-
way interaction between type of faces and trait anxiety, F(2,
324) = 72.63, p < 0.001. When trait anxiety was correlated
with the hit rates of different types of faces, trait anxiety
was more negatively correlated with accuracy for fair-related
faces (r = −0.25, p < 0.01; see Figure 3), but neither with
new faces (r = 0.01, p = 0.94) nor with unfair-related faces
(r =−0.06, p = 0.58). 4Therefore, consistent with our predictions,
participants with high trait anxiety had difficulty recognizing
fair-related faces.
Signal Detection Theory
Additional analyses using Signal Detection Theory were
conducted to further examine the relationship between trait
anxiety and recognition memories of fair and unfair faces. Signal
Detection Theory decomposes a person’s performance into
discrimination accuracy (d’) and response criteria (McNicol, 1972;
Macmillan and Creelman, 1991). d’ refers to how well a person is
capable of correctly recognizing a target and rejecting distractors,
(i.e., new faces that were not associated with an offer), which
reflects the processing of pure memory (Miller and Lewis, 1977).
A larger d’ indicates superior recognition of a target. Response
criterion (C) reflects the tendency to respond to whether a
stimulus has been presented before or not. A positive response
criterion indicates a conservative response criterion which is
biased toward judging any stimulus as not being presented before
4We conducted an analysis on Reaction Times (RT) that excluded incorrect
trials. The trimmed RTs were subjected to 3 (Type of Faces: fair-related, unfair-
related, new faces) repeated measures analysis of covariance (ANCOVA) with
z-standardized trait anxiety (STAI-trait), which yielded no significant interaction
(p = 0.11). Additional analysis found no gender effect, (p = 0.97).
TABLE 1 | Mean accuracy as a function of different types of faces during the
recognition memory task.
M SD
New faces 0.90 0.09
Old faces Fair-related ($5:$5) 0.84 0.19
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FIGURE 3 | A scatterplot indicating a negative correlation between trait version of the STAI (STAI-trait) (x-axis) and recognition rates for fair-related faces (y-axis).
r = –0.25, p < 0.01.
(new), thereby producing fewer hits and fewer false alarms.
In contrast, a negative response criterion indicates that a lax
criterion is adopted, which is biased toward judging any stimuli
as being presented before (old), thereby producing more hits and
more false alarms. As such, Signal Detection Theory allowed us
to tease apart memory processing and decision criterion and to
investigate the specific components involved in the process of
fair, unfair, and new faces (Miller and Lewis, 1977).
Following Macmillan and Creelman (1991), we computed d’,
and response criterion (C; see Table 2)5. For d’, there was a
significant main effect of the type of faces, F(2, 206) = 136.38,
p < 0.001, ηp2 = 0.57. Paired t-tests with Bonferroni correction
(2-tailed) revealed that participants showed higher d’ to fair-
related (M = 2.95, SD = 0.86) compared to unfair-related faces
(M = 1.33, SD = 0.53), t(108) = 18.74, p < 0.001, d = 2.27.
Also, participants showed higher d’ to new faces (M = 2.80,
SD = 0.98) compared to unfair-related faces, t(108) = 12.73,
p < 0.001, d = 1.87. However, there was no difference
between fair-related and new faces (p = 0.24). There was a
significant interaction between type of faces and trait anxiety,
F(2, 206) = 3.99, p < 0.03, ηp2 = 0.04. Trait anxiety was
negatively correlated with d’ for fair-related faces (r = −2.53,
p < 0.01), but not with unfair-related faces nor with new faces,
(ps > 0.46).
For response criterion (C), there was a significant main
effect of the type of faces, F(2, 206) = 575.85, p < 0.001,
5Following the recommendation of Snodgrass and Corwin (1988), we used d’ and
C for recognition memory {d’ = [z(Hit)−z(FA)], C =−[z(Hit)+z(FA)]/2}.
ηp
2 = 0.85. Paired t-tests with Bonferroni correction (2-tailed)
revealed that participants made more conservative responses
to fair-related (M = 0.53, SD = 0.13) compared to unfair-
related faces (M = 0.25, SD = 0.13), t(108) = 14.40, p < 0.001,
d = 2.15, or compared to new faces (M = 0.00, SD = 0.00),
t(108) = 41.47, p < 0.001, d = 5.77. Also, more conservative
responses were made to unfair-related faces compared to new
faces, t(108) = 20.38, p < 0.001, d = 2.72. Thus, people not only
showed good d’ but also adopted conservative response criterion
to fair-related faces. Also, there was a significant interaction
between type of faces and trait anxiety, F(2, 206) = 4.55,
p < 0.02, ηp2 = 0.04. Trait anxiety was positively correlated
with response criterion (C) for fair-related faces (r = 0.27,
p < 0.01), but not with unfair-related faces nor with new faces,
(p > 0.42). Thus, participants with low trait anxiety are more
likely to adopt liberal response criterion when recognizing fair-
related faces.
DISCUSSION
The current experiment examined whether fair consideration
modulated fair recognition. We utilized the UG task to
associate faces with fair and unfair offers and then examined
recognition memory for fair-related and unfair-related faces.
We also examined the role that trait anxiety played in the
recognition of fair-related faces. The current research provides
initial evidence that people showed enhanced memory for faces
that made fair offers in the economic decision task. However,
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TABLE 2 | Mean values of discrimination indices as a function of different types of faces.
Hit rates Misses Discrimination accuracy (d’) Criterion (C)
M SD M SD M SD M SD
Condition
Fair 0.85 0.19 0.15 0.19 2.95 0.86 0.53 0.13
Unfair (Total) 0.67 0.16 0.33 0.16 1.33 0.53 0.25 0.13
Correct rejections False alarms
New Face 0.90 0.09 0.1 0.09 2.80 0.98 0 0
individuals with high trait anxiety showed reduced memory
for fair-related faces compared to those with low anxiety.
These results were further confirmed by additional analysis
using the signal detection theory. Participants showed higher
d’ and more conservative decision criterion to fair-related faces
compared to unfair-related or new faces, and participants with
low trait anxiety were associated with higher d’ and more
lax response criterion in response to fair-related faces. The
current experiment provided evidence that fair consideration
influenced and shaped face recognition, which was modulated
by trait anxiety.
The result of the current experiment provided
additional evidence to support the ecological theory of
face recognition (McArthur and Baron, 1983; Zebrowitz,
2006). The ecological theory of face recognition posits
that face recognition plays an important role in guiding
interpersonal relationships and navigating the social
world (McArthur and Baron, 1983; Zebrowitz, 2006).
We predicted that participants would be more likely
to remember people who make fair offers in a face
recognition task because enhanced recognition of fair-
related faces would be highly useful and adaptive in
building a social relationship and economic partners
for the future. The result of the experiment supported
the hypothesis, thereby providing further evidence
supporting the ecological theory of face recognition
(McArthur and Baron, 1983; Zebrowitz, 2006).
The result of the current experiment is consistent with
previous research demonstrating that human memory is easily
shaped to conform to the social norm. It has been well
established that peoples’ memories are easily altered, distorted,
or reconstructed by misinformation, beliefs, moral concerns, and
stereotypes (for reviews, see Ross, 1989; Macrae et al., 1994;
Roediger, 1996; Hirt et al., 1999; Pizarro et al., 2006; Davis
and Loftus, 2007). Among others, justice motivation plays an
important role in reconstructing and biasing human memory.
People have a long-standing belief—even a need to believe—
that the world that they live in is fair and just—termed as the
belief in a just world (BJW; Lerner and Miller, 1978). BJW can
provide a sense of security that the world is a safe place worthy
of trust and commitment (Lerner and Miller, 1978). The need
to believe in a just and fair world is so ingrained that people
are deeply disturbed by evidence that suggests otherwise and
make compensatory responses to restore the sense of justice
and fairness (Lerner and Miller, 1978). For example, people
may characterize victims negatively to be more suitable for a
negative consequence that they face (Lerner and Miller, 1978).
Furthermore, people reconstructed their memory or selectively
remembered the details of the event to be consistent with a BJW
(Callan et al., 2009). For example, when participants were asked
to recall the amount of a lottery prize for a “bad” or “good”
winner, they remembered a smaller lottery prize for the “bad”
compared to “good” winner (Callan et al., 2009). Also, when
participants were asked to recall an autobiographic memory after
experiencing favorable or unfavorable outcomes, they tend to
selectively remember events congruent with the outcome. As
such, people reconstructed and selectively remembered memory
to support BJW. Likewise, the current experiment demonstrated
that face recognition is biased to conform to the social norm
of fairness. On the other hand, unfair offers create motivational
conflict between self-interest and norm enforcements (Feng
et al., 2015). Resolving the conflict requires a greater allocation
of cognitive resources, which may have depleted resources
necessary to make the strong association between faces and unfair
offers. As a result, people may have shown reduced memory
for unfair faces.
Our results may appear to contradict previous research
showing superior memory for untrustworthy faces. For example,
in the experiment (Rule et al., 2012), participants were presented
with trustworthy and untrustworthy faces in a passive task
and then asked to recognize faces presented. Participants
demonstrated better memory for untrustworthy compared to
trustworthy faces. However, there are several conceptual and
methodological differences that may account for the discrepancy
between the present experiment and previous research. First,
trustworthiness/untrustworthiness and fairness/unfairness are
different constructs. They are related, but not identical. Fairness
may be one of the attributions that allow someone to
be trustworthy. However, trustworthiness may require other
attributions, such as honesty and truthfulness. For example,
someone can be deceitful and untrustworthy, but fair. In fact,
according to the Oxford Dictionary (OED, 2018) fairness is
defined as being “the ability to be relied on as honest or
trustful.” As such, fairness and trustworthiness are different
constructs, which may be operated by different psychological
mechanisms; thus they may affect cognitive processes differently.
Secondly, there is a substantial methodological difference in
which two studies were conducted. Rule et al. (2012) presented
facial stimuli in the passive viewing task. However, in the
current study, participants learned to associate each face with
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fairness or unfairness through direct experiences, which may
provide more ecological validity. Previous research has shown
that the context in which faces are presented plays an important
role in face recognition (Buchner et al., 2009). The current
experiment provided strong contextual information or source
memory by allowing participants to experience direct business
dealings with each face, which may have ensured the effect
of fairness on face recognition. However, during the passive
presentation, participants had to rely on subjective and intuitive
judgments to determine the trustworthiness of each face,
which may have been influenced by other factors. In fact,
concerns were raised regarding the validity and predictive
power of people’s judgment on trustworthiness (for review, see
Todorov et al., 2008; Stirrat and Perrett, 2010). For example,
previous research has shown that people heavily relied on
physiognomic features, such as resemblance with emotional
expression (Oosterhof and Todorov, 2008) or facial resemblance
(DeBruine, 2005) to determine facial trustworthiness. If this is
the case, it is possible that the recognition of untrustworthy
faces may be confounded by negative emotional expressions;
it is well documented that people remember emotionally
negative expressions better than emotionally neutral ones
(Buchanan, 2007). Furthermore, judgments and recognition
on trustworthiness varied depending on the context in which
face stimuli were presented (DeBruine, 2005; Brambilla et al.,
2018), so did the recognition of untrustworthy faces. Previous
research found mixed results of trustworthiness memory when
contextual information was provided by verbal description
(Mealey et al., 1996; Barclay and Lalumiere, 2006; Rule et al.,
2012). Thus, further research is necessary to tease apart the
difference between fairness and trustworthiness and underlying
cognitive mechanisms.
The current research provided evidence that individual
differences in anxiety modulated the accuracy of fair-related
memory, such that individuals with high trait anxiety showed
reduced memory for fair-related faces compared to those with
low trait anxiety. Previous research reported that clinically
anxious participants accepted more unfair offers than healthy
controls (Grecucci et al., 2013). Fairness was considered socially
preferable and normative (Feng et al., 2015). Thus, when the
social norm of fairness is violated, people are willing to punish
fairness norm violators at the cost of losing money in the UG
task. However, individuals with high anxiety want to avoid
social confrontation, thus being more willing to accept unfair
offers (Grecucci et al., 2013). To avoid anxiety associated with
confronting and punishing fair norm violators, individuals with
high anxiety might need to minimize the advantage of fairness
and be less mindful of the violation of the fairness norm. As a
result, individuals with high anxiety may show reduced memory
for the proposers who made fair offers. Also, due to poor memory
of fair-related stimuli, individuals with high anxiety are less likely
to take advantage of fair business dealings and trades in the future
and to form a meaningful social relationship with moral and
ethical individuals.
The correlation between low trait anxiety and more lax
response criterion may suggest that participants with low trait
anxiety may experience greater familiarity of fair-related faces.
According to dual-processing theories of recognition memory,
two processes—recollection and familiarity—are involved in
memory performance (see Yonelinas, 2002. for a review).
Recollection refers to the recollection evoked by an old item that
was specifically presented before, whereas familiarity refers to a
sense of familiarity that people experience to an item without
specific recollection of previous encounter (Knowlton and Squire,
1995). Yonelinas (2002) demonstrated that changes in response
criterion affect familiarity, but not recollection. Thus, the fact
that individuals with low trait anxiety adopted more lax response
criterion suggests that individuals with low trait anxiety were
more likely to use familiarity-based processes when responding
to fair-related faces. However, more reliance on familiarity-
based processing did not compromise their ability to accurately
recognize the fair-related faces as individuals with low trait
anxiety demonstrated high d’. Nevertheless, we did not directly
employ the retrieval procedures to differentiate the recollection-
and familiarity-related processes. Thus, the caution should be
made to interpret the relationship between anxiety and response
criteria using the recollection-familiarity frameworks.
It should be noted that we did not find that anxiety modulated
the acceptance rate of unfair offers during the UG task. Previous
research was conducted on patients who have clinically diagnosed
anxiety disorders (Grecucci et al., 2013). However, the current
research was conducted using healthy individuals with high
trait anxiety scores. In fact, previous research which studied
participants with subclinical anxiety did not find that anxiety
modulated acceptance rates (Luo et al., 2014). Thus, it is possible
that the severity of anxiety plays an important role in economic
decision making.
Neuroimaging evidence (Tabibnia et al., 2008) has shown
that fair offers in the UG task elicited greater activation in the
ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC), a core region associated
with integrating values into decision-making (Hare et al., 2010;
Hunt et al., 2012). Fair offers elicited the continuous activation
of the vmPFC, which remained strong after controlling for
the monetary payoff, suggesting that the vmPFC is involved
in processing positive norm values associated with fair offers
(Tabibnia et al., 2008; Roy et al., 2012). Furthermore, some
neuroimaging studies have reported that the vmPFC is implicated
in memory consolidation (for reviews, see Nieuwenhuis and
Takashima, 2011). Thus, the vmPFC is involved in both assessing
positive norm values associated with fair offers and memory
consolidation of information, which may provide neurological
mechanisms of memory bias favoring fair offers in the UG
task. However, neuroimaging evidence will be necessary to
clarify further the neural mechanisms underlying the relationship
between fair consideration and human memory.
CONCLUSION
The current research suggests that face recognition is modulated
by fair consideration—a social norm that people inherently prefer
to confirm. People showed enhanced memory for faces that
made fair offers, which was further confirmed by the signal
detection theory. Furthermore, we provided evidence that high
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fpsyg-10-00760 April 14, 2019 Time: 11:9 # 8
Park et al. Fairness-Modulated Memory and Anxiety
trait anxiety was associated with reduced memory for fair-related
faces, which might place individuals with high trait anxiety to be
disadvantageous in social and economic situations.
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